9.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2025-59340

CVE-2025-59340: jinjava Sandbox Bypass via JavaType-Based Deserialization

jinjava is a Java-based template engine based on django template syntax, adapted to render jinja templates. Priori to 2.8.1, by using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2025-59340

CVE-2025-59340:

9.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

SSVC / BOD 26-04 ↗

Exploitation NoneAutomatable YesTech Impact Total

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Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava	maven	< 2.8.1	2.8.1

Technical Details

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Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability, identified as GHSA-m49c-g9wr-hv6v, is a sandbox bypass in jinjava. The provided description and proof-of-concept (PoC) clearly indicate that the vulnerability is triggered by accessing properties of the JinjavaInterpreter instance, which is exposed in the template context as ____int3rpr3t3r____. Specifically, the PoC accesses the config property to get an ObjectMapper instance, which is then used to deserialize arbitrary classes.

The patch in commit 66df351e7e8ad71ca04dcacb4b65782af820b8b1 directly addresses this issue. The change in src/main/java/com/hubspot/jinjava/el/ext/JinjavaBeanELResolver.java modifies the getValue method. This method is responsible for resolving property access in JSTL expressions. The added code if (isRestrictedClass(base)) { return null; } prevents property access on restricted classes. The tests added in the same commit confirm that accessing interpreter.config is now blocked.

Therefore, the vulnerable function is com.hubspot.jinjava.el.ext.JinjavaBeanELResolver.getValue because, prior to the patch, it failed to perform the necessary security check, allowing the sandbox bypass.

Vulnerable functions

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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