9.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2025-54539

CVE-2025-54539: Apache ActiveMQ NMS AMQP Client has a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability

A Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability exists in the Apache ActiveMQ NMS AMQP Client.

This issue affects all versions of Apache ActiveMQ NMS AMQP up to and including 2.3.0, when establishing connections to untrusted AMQP servers. Malicious servers could exploit unbounded deserialization logic present in the client to craft responses that may lead to arbitrary code execution on the client side.

Although version 2.1.0 introduced a mechanism to restrict deserialization via allow/deny lists, the protection was found to be bypassable under certain conditions.

In line with Microsoft’s deprecation of binary serialization in .NET 9, the project is evaluating the removal of .NET binary serialization support from the NMS API entirely in future releases.

Mitigation and Recommendations: Users are strongly encouraged to upgrade to version 2.4.0 or later, which resolves the issue. Additionally, projects depending on NMS-AMQP should migrate away from .NET binary serialization as part of a long-term hardening strategy.

(GitHub Advisory)

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CVE-2025-54539

CVE-2025-54539:

9.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
Apache.NMS.AMQP	nuget	< 2.4.0	2.4.0

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The analysis of the security vulnerability CVE-2025-54539 in the Apache ActiveMQ NMS AMQP client reveals a critical flaw in the deserialization process, which could be exploited for remote code execution. The vulnerability stems from a bypass in the allow/deny list mechanism designed to control which types can be deserialized.

The root cause is a two-part logic flaw. First, the TrustedClassFilter.BindToType method, which is supposed to resolve type names from a serialized stream, did not properly handle cases where a type could not be found. It would pass a null Type object down the line instead of raising an error. Second, the NmsDefaultDeserializationPolicy.IsTrustedType method, which checks if a type is trusted, had a critical error where it would consider a null type as trusted (return true).

An attacker could craft a malicious AMQP message containing a serialized object with manipulated type information. This would cause BindToType to fail to resolve the type and return null. This null value would then be passed to IsTrustedType, which would incorrectly approve it, allowing the deserialization of the untrusted, and potentially malicious, object. The provided patch addresses both of these flaws by adding a null check in BindToType and changing the logic in IsTrustedType to correctly deny null types. Both functions are central to the vulnerability and would be observed in a runtime trace during an exploit.

Vulnerable functions

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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