6.9

CVSS Score

3.1

Basic Information

CVE ID

CVE-2025-53621

GHSA ID

GHSA-jjwr-5cfh-7xwh

EPSS Score

CWE

CWE-611

Published

7/15/2025

Updated

7/15/2025

KEV Status

Technology

Java

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CVE-2025-53621

CVE-2025-53621: DSpace is vulnerable to XML External Entity injection during archive imports

Impact

Two related XXE injection possibilities have been discovered, impacting all versions of DSpace prior to 7.6.4, 8.2 and 9.1.

External entities are not disabled when parsing XML files during import of an archive (in Simple Archive Format), either from command-line (./dspace import command) or from the "Batch Import (Zip)" user interface feature. (Likely impacts all versions of DSpace 1.x <= 7.6.3, 8.0 <= 8.1, and 9.0)
External entities are also not explicitly disabled when parsing XML responses from some upstream services (ArXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, Creative Commons) used in import from external sources via the user interface or REST API. (Impacts all versions of DSpace 7.0 <= 7.6.3, 8.0 <= 8.1 and 9.0)

An XXE injection in these files may result in a connection being made to an attacker's site or a local path readable by the Tomcat user, with content potentially being injected into a metadata field. In the latter case, this may result in sensitive content disclosure, including retrieving arbitrary files or configurations from the server where DSpace is running or content from remote URLs. The ability to include content from a remote URL could result in a request forgery attack, and disclosure of sensitive information in the response.

The Simple Archive Format (SAF) importer / Batch Import (Zip) is only usable by site administrators (from user interface / REST API) or system administrators (from command-line). Therefore, to exploit this vulnerability, the malicious payload would have to be provided by an attacker and trusted by an administrator (who would trigger the import).

The most severe practical impact is a case where an attacker obtains DSpace administrator credentials and uses the Batch Import feature with a malicious SAF archive to expose sensitive local files readable by the Tomcat user, or secrets and access tokens from an authenticated service via request forgery.
An attacker without administrative credentials might use some other tactic to convince an administrator to import a malicious SAF archive they have supplied.

The Import from External Sources feature has a narrower attack vector. While this feature is usable by any DSpace Submitter, the malicious payload must be provided by the external source (e.g. arXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, or Creative Commons). No known method exists for an attacker to inject XXE via content uploads. Instead, the service itself would need to be compromised in such a way that it would inject a malicious payload into its API response.

Patches

The fix is included in DSpace 7.6.4, 8.2 and 9.1. Please upgrade to one of these versions.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, it is possible to manually patch your DSpace backend. (No changes are necessary to the frontend.) A pull request exists which can be used to patch systems running DSpace 7.6.x, 8.x or 9.0. This pull request provides central methods to retrieve Java XML, SAX, JAXB XML document builders with safe default settings, including XXE protection.

Pull request for 7.x: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/pull/11032 (Downloadable patch file)
Pull request for 8.x: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/pull/11034 (Downloadable patch file)
Pull request for 9.0: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/pull/11035 (Downloadable patch file)

Apply the patch to your DSpace

If at all possible, we recommend upgrading your DSpace site based on the upgrade instructions. However, if you are unable to do so, you can manually apply the above patches to your DSpace backend as follows:

Download the appropriate patch file to the machine where DSpace backend is running
From the [dspace-src] folder, apply the patch, e.g. git apply [name-of-file].patch
Now, update your DSpace site (based loosely on the Upgrade instructions). This generally involves three steps:
1. Rebuild DSpace, e.g. mvn -U clean package (This will recompile all DSpace backend code)
2. Redeploy DSpace, e.g. ant update (This will copy all newly built code to your installation directory). Depending on your setup you also may need to copy the updated "server" webapp over to your Tomcat webapps folder.
3. Restart Tomcat (or runnable JAR)

Workarounds

Patching the system is the recommended fix. It is not possible to fully protect your system via workarounds.

That said, until you are able to patch your system or upgrade, you can apply these best practices:

Administrators must carefully inspect any SAF archives (they did not construct themselves) before importing. If SAF archives are too large to manually inspect, you should avoid importing them until your site is patched.
As necessary, affected external services can be disabled (see documentation) to mitigate the ability for a malicious payload to be delivered via external service APIs.

Credits

Discovered & reported by Pablo Picurelli Ortiz (@superpegaso2703) Code fix developed by Kim Shepherd (@kshepherd) of The Library Code

For more information

XXE Cheat Sheet / Explanations
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact us at security@dspace.org

(GitHub Advisory)

6.9

CVSS Score

3.1

Basic Information

CVE ID

CVE-2025-53621

GHSA ID

GHSA-jjwr-5cfh-7xwh

EPSS Score

CWE

CWE-611

Published

7/15/2025

Updated

7/15/2025

KEV Status

Technology

Java

Technical Details

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
org.dspace:dspace-api	maven	< 7.6.4	7.6.4
org.dspace:dspace-api	maven	>= 8.0, < 8.2	8.2
org.dspace:dspace-api	maven	>= 9.0, < 9.1	9.1

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability advisory describes two primary XXE attack vectors: one through the Simple Archive Format (SAF) import feature and another through parsing XML from external data sources. The analysis of the provided patches confirms this and reveals the widespread nature of insecure XML parser instantiation across the DSpace codebase.

The core of the fix is the introduction of a centralized org.dspace.app.util.XMLUtils class. This class provides factory methods (getDocumentBuilder, getSAXBuilder, etc.) that return XML parsers configured with secure defaults, specifically disabling external entity resolution features that lead to XXE vulnerabilities (e.g., disallow-doctype-decl, external-general-entities).

The investigation of the commits shows numerous files where default, insecure DocumentBuilderFactory, DocumentBuilder, and SAXBuilder instances were being created. These insecure instances were then replaced with calls to the new secure methods in XMLUtils.

The identified vulnerable functions are key points where the application processes XML that could be controlled by an attacker, either directly (by an administrator uploading a malicious archive) or indirectly (if a trusted external service was compromised).

org.dspace.app.itemimport.ItemImportServiceImpl.loadXML is the primary function for handling metadata XML in SAF archives, making it a direct target for the first attack vector.
org.dspace.importer.external.* services, such as those for ArXiv and CrossRef, and the CCLicenseConnectorServiceImpl, directly correspond to the second attack vector, where XML is fetched from an external API and parsed insecurely.
org.dspace.content.packager.METSManifest.create represents another archive-based vector, as METS is a common packaging format for digital objects.

By replacing the insecure parser initializations in these functions, the patch effectively mitigates the XXE risk.

Vulnerable functions

org.dspace.app.itemimport.ItemImportServiceImpl.loadXML

dspace-api/src/main/java/org/dspace/app/itemimport/ItemImportServiceImpl.java

The function `loadXML` within `ItemImportServiceImpl` is used to parse XML metadata files during a Simple Archive Format (SAF) import. Prior to the patch, it used a default `DocumentBuilder` created via `DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance()`, which does not disable external entity processing by default. This makes the application vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) injection if an attacker can supply a malicious metadata XML file within an archive.

org.dspace.importer.external.arxiv.service.ArXivImportMetadataSourceServiceImpl$1.call

dspace-api/src/main/java/org/dspace/importer/external/arxiv/service/ArXivImportMetadataSourceServiceImpl.java

This function, located in an anonymous inner class within `ArXivImportMetadataSourceServiceImpl`, processes XML responses from the ArXiv external import source. It used a default `SAXBuilder`, which is vulnerable to XXE. If the ArXiv service were compromised to return a malicious XML payload, it could be exploited.

org.dspace.importer.external.crossref.CrossRefAbstractProcessor.prettifyAbstract

dspace-api/src/main/java/org/dspace/importer/external/crossref/CrossRefAbstractProcessor.java

This function parses an XML string derived from a CrossRef API response. It used a default `DocumentBuilder`, making it vulnerable to XXE if a malicious payload is present in the 'abstractValue' from the CrossRef response.

org.dspace.license.CCLicenseConnectorServiceImpl.<init>

dspace-api/src/main/java/org/dspace/license/CCLicenseConnectorServiceImpl.java

The `CCLicenseConnectorServiceImpl` class, which handles interactions with the Creative Commons API, initialized a `SAXBuilder` instance variable with default settings, making it vulnerable to XXE. This parser is then used to process XML responses from the Creative Commons service. The vulnerability lies in the initialization of the parser used by the class methods.

org.dspace.content.packager.METSManifest.create

dspace-api/src/main/java/org/dspace/content/packager/METSManifest.java

This function is responsible for creating a METS (Metadata Encoding and Transmission Standard) package manifest from an InputStream. It used a `SAXBuilder` that was not securely configured to prevent XXE attacks, especially when validation was turned off. This is another entry point for archive-based XXE attacks.

WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

T** vuln*r**ility **visory **s*ri**s two prim*ry XX* *tt**k v**tors: on* t*rou** t** Simpl* *r**iv* *orm*t (S**) import ***tur* *n* *not**r t*rou** p*rsin* XML *rom *xt*rn*l **t* sour**s. T** *n*lysis o* t** provi*** p*t***s *on*irms t*is *n* r*v**ls

6.9

Basic Information

Concerned about an active attack path?

CVE-2025-53621: DSpace is vulnerable to XML External Entity injection during archive imports

Impact

Patches

Apply the patch to your DSpace

Workarounds

Credits

For more information

6.9

Basic Information

Technical Details

Vulnerability IntelligenceMiggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

Vulnerable functions

WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

Reasoning

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI