9.9

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2025-47949

CVE-2025-47949: samlify SAML Signature Wrapping attack

A Signature Wrapping attack has been found in samlify <v2.10.0, allowing an attacker to forge a SAML Response to authenticate as any user. An attacker would need a signed XML document by the identity provider.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2025-47949

CVE-2025-47949:

9.9

CVSS Score

4.0

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
samlify	npm	< 2.10.0	2.10.0

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability is a Signature Wrapping attack, which inherently involves the process of verifying XML signatures. The provided commit 115679acd89f0a37ea3ebd8fff7db54fca3e8af3 directly modifies the src/libsaml.ts file, which contains the core SAML processing logic.

libSaml.verifySignature: This function is central to validating incoming SAML messages. The diff shows substantial changes to how it locates signature elements, validates them, and, crucially, how it determines which part of the XML document is actually covered by the signature. The introduction of more precise XPath queries and the logic to return the authenticated assertion node directly addresses the signature wrapping vulnerability. The removed code sections represent the prior, vulnerable logic that could be tricked.
libSaml.getKeyInfo: This function is responsible for providing key information (like X.509 certificates) used in the signature verification process. The patch refactors its internal structure. While this change might seem like a simple code improvement, it occurs in the context of a security patch and an update to the xml-crypto dependency. An unstable or incorrect getKeyInfo could lead to failures or bypasses in signature validation. The refactoring suggests the previous implementation was problematic, potentially in how it interacted with the xml-crypto library or managed state, thus contributing indirectly to the overall security posture.

The createSignature function was also modified, but since the vulnerability is about an attacker forging a SAML response (implying an issue with verifying an incoming signature), createSignature (which is for outgoing messages) is less likely to be the primary vulnerable function in the context of this specific attack vector. Its changes are likely to align with the updated xml-crypto library and ensure correct signature creation practices.

The analysis focuses on functions whose modifications in the patch directly relate to the described signature wrapping attack mechanism and the processing of potentially malicious input (the SAML XML).

Vulnerable functions

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Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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