The vulnerability, as described, is due to an incomplete set of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) being used to seal the disk encryption key. The configuration partition's measurement was moved to PCR 14, but the sealing process did not include this PCR. This allows for tampering with the configuration partition without invalidating the sealed key.
The analysis of the provided patch commit d9383a7ee4e1c39f5c8c6d4a63cb2ebd00695e8a confirms this. The commit modifies the DiskKeySealingPCRs global variable in pkg/pillar/evetpm/tpm.go to include PCR 14 and updates the hashing algorithm. This variable dictates which PCRs are used for sealing operations.
By inspecting the source code of pkg/pillar/evetpm/tpm.go, the function SealDiskKey was identified as the function that utilizes the DiskKeySealingPCRs variable to perform the sealing operation via tpm2.Seal. Therefore, SealDiskKey is the function that would be executing the vulnerable logic. During exploitation, an attacker would cause this function to seal a key without accounting for the state of the configuration partition (PCR 14), which could then be maliciously modified.