7.5

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2023-38493

CVE-2023-38493: Paths contain matrix variables bypass decorators

Impact

Spring supports Matrix variables. When Spring integration is used, Armeria calls Spring controllers via TomcatService or JettyService with the path that may contain matrix variables. In this situation, the Armeria decorators might not invoked because of the matrix variables. Let's see the following example:

// Spring controller
@GetMapping("/important/resources")
public String important() {...}

// Armeria decorator
ServerBuilder sb = ...
sb.decoratorUnder("/important/", authService);

If an attacker sends a request with /important;a=b/resources, the request would bypass the authrorizer

Patches

https://github.com/line/armeria-ghsa-wvp2-9ppw-337j/commit/9b0ec3e099cc05fbff11d7f1012a1dddb0000d0c

Workarounds

Users can add decorators using regex. e.g. "regex:^/important.*"

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2023-38493

CVE-2023-38493:

7.5

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
com.linecorp.armeria:armeria	maven	<= 1.24.2	1.24.3

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability stems from how matrix variables were handled in request paths. The key functions are DefaultRequestTarget.forServer (which processes incoming paths) and RequestTarget.path (which returns the path for matching). Before the patch, these functions did not strip matrix variables from the path used for decorator matching. The commit adds matrix variable removal logic in DefaultRequestTarget and introduces RequestTarget.maybePathWithMatrixVariables to handle Spring's requirements, while ensuring decorators see the normalized path. The vulnerable versions lacked this sanitization, allowing path-based decorators to be bypassed via matrix variable injection.

Vulnerable functions

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WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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