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CVE-2013-1624: Improper Input Validation in Bouncy Castle

4

CVSS Score

Basic Information

EPSS Score
0.66421%
Published
5/14/2022
Updated
1/27/2023
KEV Status
No
Technology
TechnologyJava

Technical Details

CVSS Vector
AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
Package NameEcosystemVulnerable VersionsFirst Patched Version
org.bouncycastle:bcprov-jdk15onmaven< 1.481.48

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AIMiggo AI

Miggo AIRoot Cause Analysis

The vulnerability centers on non-constant-time processing of CBC padding and MAC checks. The Openwall analysis explicitly identifies Bouncy Castle's deviation from RFC recommendations (using last-byte-derived padding length rather than zero-length assumption). The TlsBlockCipher.decrypt() method is the logical location for this decryption/padding/MAC validation sequence in Bouncy Castle's TLS implementation. The described vulnerability pattern matches classic TLS CBC padding oracle vulnerabilities where timing differences between padding validation and MAC validation steps are exploitable.

Vulnerable functions

Only Mi**o us*rs **n s** t*is s**tion

WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

T** TLS impl*m*nt*tion in t** *oun*y **stl* J*v* li*r*ry ***or* *.** *n* *# li*r*ry ***or* *.* *o*s not prop*rly *onsi**r timin* si**-***nn*l *tt**ks on * non*ompli*nt M** ****k op*r*tion *urin* t** pro**ssin* o* m*l*orm** *** p***in*, w*i** *llows r

Reasoning

T** vuln*r**ility **nt*rs on non-*onst*nt-tim* pro**ssin* o* *** p***in* *n* M** ****ks. T** Op*nw*ll *n*lysis *xpli*itly i**nti*i*s *oun*y **stl*'s **vi*tion *rom R** r**omm*n**tions (usin* l*st-*yt*-**riv** p***in* l*n*t* r*t**r t**n z*ro-l*n*t* *s