7.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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CVE-2026-20613

CVE-2026-20613: Container and Containerization archive extraction does not guard against escapes from extraction base directory.

The ArchiveReader.extractContents() function used by cctl image load and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames. This issue is addressed in container 0.8.0 and containerization 0.21.0.

(GitHub Advisory)

Miggo Vulnerability Database

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CVE-2026-20613

CVE-2026-20613:

7.8

CVSS Score

3.1

-

CVSS Score

Basic Information

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Technical Details

Package Name	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Versions	First Patched Version
github.com/apple/containerization	swift	<= 0.20.1	0.21.0
github.com/apple/container	swift	<= 0.7.1	0.8.0

Technical Details

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

Root Cause Analysis

The security advisory explicitly points out a path traversal vulnerability in the ArchiveReader.extractContents() function in apple/containerization. Analysis of the provided fixing commit, 3e93416b9a6d7b4c25fff7e9dea22a9ca687ee52, confirms this. The commit shows a complete replacement of the extractContents(to:) function within the file Sources/ContainerizationArchive/ArchiveReader.swift (which was renamed from Reader.swift).

The original, vulnerable implementation directly concatenated the path from the archive entry to the destination directory (let target = directory.appending(path: p)) without any sanitization or validation. This allows an attacker to craft an archive with file paths containing ../ sequences to escape the intended extraction directory.

The patch introduces a secure implementation that uses file descriptors and a new helper file, Sources/ContainerizationOS/FileDescriptor+SecurePath.swift, to perform secure path operations. The new code explicitly validates paths to ensure they do not contain traversal components (..) and do not follow symbolic links that could lead outside the extraction root. The vulnerable function is therefore the original ArchiveReader.extractContents(to:) which was removed by this patch.

Vulnerable functions

ArchiveReader.extractContents(to:)

Sources/ContainerizationArchive/Reader.swift

The function `extractContents(to:)` in the `ArchiveReader` class is vulnerable to path traversal. It constructs the extraction path for an archive entry by appending the entry's path (`p`) directly to the base extraction directory. The function fails to validate or sanitize the entry's path, which can contain relative path components like `../`. A malicious archive can use these components to write files outside of the intended extraction directory, leading to arbitrary file writes in any location the user has write permissions for.

Vulnerability Intelligence
Miggo AI

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WAF Protection Rules

WAF Rule

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Reasoning

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